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Schizophrenic Hong Kong: Postcolonial Identity Crisis in 
the Infernal Affairs Trilogy 
HOWARD Y. F. CHOY 
 
 
 
Michel Foucault avers: «one should totally and absolutely suspect anything that 
claims to be a return. . . . there is in fact no such thing as a return.» It is, however, in 
rigid irredentist claims of the return that Hong Kong was handed over from British to 
Chinese rule in 1997. To the natives of Hong Kong, this postcolonial turn is actually 
less a decolonization than a recolonization of the capitalist Cantonese city by the 
mainland Mandarin master. They find themselves helplessly trapped in the dual 
nationality of overseas British and Chinese nationals. This existential agony is deftly 
cinematized in the Infernal Affairs trilogy under the disguise of a police epic. The 2002 
box-office success and its 2003 prequel and sequel tell a story about an undercover 
cop and a mafia mole. A crisis of consciousness arises from both the former’s desire to 
regain his true identity and the latter’s struggle to become a real cop. The identity 
crisis is not only about, as critics suggest, split personalities between good and evil, 
but also political tensions between the colonized and colonizers. This paper argues 
that the collective failure of identity change before and after the fin de siècle 
changeover characterizes the Special Administrative Region’s schizophrenic return. 
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Chineseness/Britishness: Return and Depart 
Michel Foucault avers: «One should totally and absolutely suspect anything that 
claims to be a return. . . . there is in fact no such thing as a return».1 It was, however, 
in rigid irredentist claims of a «return» that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
took over Hong Kong from Great Britain in 1997. Such a «return», or huigui, is at 
bottom no more than a reversion to sovereignty, and of course sovereign power in 
this case belongs to the great «motherland» that possesses the Chinese territory, not 
to the people who actually live there. To the autochthons of the small Hong Kong, 
this postcolonial (re)turn is actually more a recolonization than a decolonization of 
the capitalist Cantonese city by the mainland Mandarin master. They find 
themselves helplessly trapped in the juxtaposition of the dual identities of 
«overseas» British (as classified and parenthesized in their passports), who have no 
right of abode in their adopted country, and Chinese nationals, who have no choice 
in determining their own nationality. For them, the reunification with China as a 
national integration produces but a nervous breakdown. Being adherents to, or 
more precisely, abandonees of the fallen British Empire and denizens of the rising 
People’s Republic, how could they possibly redeem Chineseness to reinvent their 
ethnic identity when the tribal appellation Heung-gong yan, or «Hong Konger», no 
longer demands a mere cultural identity but also a political subjectivity and social 
entity?2 
 
The concept of Chineseness, however, is problematic. Chinese American neo-
Confucian Tu Wei-ming (1994: 13-15) has argued that it is the diasporic Chinese 
individuals who truly understand China, inasmuch as they inherit and disseminate 
its culture from a critical distance.3 Accordingly, Chineseness lies elsewhere than 
China proper. Tu’s analysis assumes that a Chinese identity is to be forged by 
searching for «Chineseness», not to be taken for granted simply by living in the 
«motherland». He defines the idea of cultural China in terms of what he calls «three 
symbolic universes», to wit, the Chinese societies of the PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
and Singapore; diasporic Chinese communities, including all Chinatowns 
throughout the world; and individual ethnic Chinese as well as non-Chinese 
outside of China, who try to intellectually understand Chinese culture and promote 
                                                 
1Paul Rabinow, «Space, Knowledge, and Power: Interview of Michel Foucault», trans. Christian Hubert, 
Skyline, vol. 20, no7, March 1982, p.20. 
2British scholar Matthew Turner (1995: 22-23, 31, 33n26) has aptly argued that Heung-gong yan as “an 
identity of life-style” is “an ambiguous construction that was more than a ‘resident’, less than a 
‘people,’” but on his agenda Hong Kong people must claim themselves “as a ‘people’, an ethno-cultural 
sub-group.” 
3Tu Wei-ming, 1994. «Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center», in Tu Wei-ming, ed., The Living Tree: 
The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp.13-15. 
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it. Tu admits that his overarching tripartite division is problematic as «Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Singapore have much more in common with the Chinese diaspora 
than they do with mainland China», and yet «they are grouped together with 
mainland China as the first symbolic universe because the life orientation in these 
societies is based on Chinese culture». 
 
I find Tu’s argument more convenient than convincing, for it neglects the 
geopolitical marginality and cultural hybridity of Hong Kong. An island off of the 
mainland and longi temporis possessio of a Western hegemony, Hong Kong is actually, 
as Tu acknowledges it, «at least in spirit, part of the Chinese diaspora».4 The 
diasporized Hong Kong people are neither part of the majority living in the 
mainland — in the bosom of a supposedly «authentic» Chinese culture, nor are they 
one of the «minority nationalities» (shaoshu minzu) categorized by the government, 
who are ethnically different from the Han. Hong Kong people are in-between, both 
local and global; they are somehow children of a Sino-genetic mother and a foreign 
foster mother. What makes Hong Kong unique are its at once diasporic mentality 
within the Chinese cultural world and eccentric «Chineseness» without the modern 
nation-state known as China — be it the Republic of China or the People’s Republic 
of China, but no longer the Qing empire. I am not suggesting that mainland 
Chineseness is always fixed (in fact it is already forfeited according to Tu’s neo-
Confucianist and anti-communist agenda) but that the quest(ion) of «Chineseness» 
in Hong Kong is further complicated by the postcolonial position of the periphery. 
 
Criticizing Tu’s conception of cultural China for projecting «a de-centered center» 
on the periphery, Australian cultural scholar Ien Ang (2000: 287, 282-283) proposes 
a diasporic paradigm, in which Chineseness «as an open and indeterminate 
signifier whose meanings are constantly renegotiated and rearticulated» should 
indicate «many different Chinese identities, not one».5 While Rey Chow questions 
whether the problem can «be resolved simply by way of the act of pluralizing» 
Chineseness into «so many kinds of Chineseness-es»,6 Hong Kong cultural critic Lo 
Kwai-Cheung points out that Tu’s reversal of center-periphery hierarchy «may only 
help to make the cultural and national ideology of Chineseness [a] more powerful, 
oppressive, and dominating» master code concealing its emptiness and «the void of 
subjectivity». Instead of putting Hong Kong on a par with mainland China as «the 
                                                 
4Tu Wei-ming, p.15. 
5Ien Ang, «Can One Say No to Chineseness? Pushing the Limits of the Diasporic Paradigm», in Rey 
Chow, ed., Modern Chinese Literary and Cultural Studies in the Age of Theory: Reimagining a Field, , Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2000, pp.281-300. 
6Rey Chow, «Introduction: On Chineseness as a Theoretical Problem», in Modern Chinese Literary and 
Cultural Studies in the Age of Theory, Durham: Duke University Press, 2000, p.18. 

	
			
	

跨文化  55 
first symbolic universe», Lo sees Hong Kong’s position «both inside and outside of 
China», hence often shifting toward its Chineseness. His idea of «Hong Kong-styled 
Chineseness» is worth citing at some length: 
 
«Hong Kong culture itself is by no means fixed. It is instead a process of 
becoming, generated by various national forces and interests rather than by a 
single origin. . . . The post-1997 subjectivization of the Hong Kong people as 
Chinese nationals demonstrates that a different notion of Chineseness can 
always gratify new demands and that the return of the colony to its 
motherland might present a challenging perspective from which to examine 
the supposedly incontestable status of national identity.»7 
 
The process of becoming, in my view, is paradoxically also one of departing. Only 
after a departure from an origin would a transformation be possible; departing is 
prerequisite to all claims of (be)coming or returning. Departing is distancing, and 
without a distance perspectives are impossible. It is also, to cite Ang’s words once 
again, «a departure from the mode of demarcating Chineseness through an 
absolutist oppositioning of authentic and inauthentic, pure and impure, real and 
fake».8 Colonization is a process of departing. Before it was colonized by the British 
and thus forced to depart from China, Hong Kong had never pondered upon the 
problem of its Chineseness. And now, when departing from Britain, the issue of 
becoming Chinese again, or re-Sinicization, cannot be discussed without reference 
to its Britishness. While Chinese cultural conventions have been well preserved in 
the enclave, British colonial legacies are ubiquitous: parliamentary democracy in 
political debates, a legal system symbolized by the Victorian-style Supreme Court, 
financial services iconized by the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, everyday practice 
of afternoon tea with milk, the fascination with Princess Diana, streets named after 
British princes (e.g., Connaught) or governors (Hennessy, Nathan), and the list goes 
on. Hong Kongers, to borrow Aihwa Ong’s description of overseas Chinese images 
in the West, are «internal outsiders» in China, whose «deterritorialized modern 
consciousness», in my view, would never produce a pure Chineseness.9 It is in such 
sense that I would agree with Lo that for Hong Kong the Sino-British clash is not an 
external difference between contending civilizations but an internal affair within a 
culture, and that «the city is actually struggling with itself».10 
 
                                                 
7Lo Kwai-Cheung, Chinese Face/Off: The Transnational Popular Culture of Hong Kong, Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 2005, pp.2-18. 
8Ien Ang, «Can One Say No to Chineseness? Pushing the Limits of the Diasporic Paradigm», p.283. 
9Aihwa Ong, «On the Edge of Empires: Flexible Citizenship among Chinese in Diaspora», Positions: East 
Asia Cultures Critique, vol.1, no3, Winter, p.770.  
10Lo Kwai-Cheung, Chinese Face/Off: The Transnational Popular Culture of Hong Kong, p.20. 
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This existential agony is deftly cinematized as a neurotic symptom in the Infernal 
Affairs trilogy, produced by Media Asia, under the veneer of an action thriller. Co-
directed by Andrew Wai Keung Lau and Alan Siu Fai Mak with the latter’s and 
Felix Man Keung Chong’s screenplay, the 2002 blockbuster and its 2003 prequel and 
sequel tell a story about a mafia mole infiltrating the Hong Kong police force and 
his counterpart, an undercover cop planted in the triads. A crisis of consciousness 
arises from both the former’s struggle to become a real policeman and the latter’s 
desire to regain his true identity or at least, in his own words, «an identity as a 
normal man». They are, as the title of Martin Scorsese’s remake of the film suggests, 
«the departed» — departing from where they belong to, from who they are, and 
from what they want to be.11 Striving to end their lives as rats, the spies suffer from 
schizophrenia as a result of their double espionage agency. The identity crisis is not 
only about split personality between good and evil, but also political tensions 
between the colonizer and the colonized, as well as unfulfilled reconciliation 
between Chineseness and Britishness. The schizophrenic anxious return from being 
the United Kingdom’s «crown jewel» to becoming the Middle Kingdom’s Special 
Administrative Region before and after the fin de siècle changeover characterizes a 
collective failure of resuming a single, clear-cut identity for a postcolonial global 
city. 
Internal Struggling/Infernal Suffering 
In his review of the cinema of the colonial city with regard to local identity 
formation, Leung Ping-kwan, a veteran Hong Kong cultural critic and creative 
writer, once regretfully concluded: «It would be difficult to claim any conscious 
postcolonial awareness in films produced before and after 1997, especially because 
Hong Kong cinema has always been commercial in nature with less emphasis on 
                                                 
11The first film of the trilogy was so successful on the domestic and international markets that 
Hollywood has produced a remake, The Departed (2006), which won the Academy Awards of Best 
Motion Picture, Best Director, Best Adapted Screenplay, and Best Film Editing in 2007. Directed by 
Martin Scorsese and rewritten by William Monahan, The Departed has the story setting shifted from 
Hong Kong to Boston. While a full-fledged discussion of the new version will have to be taken up on a 
different occasion, I want to point out here that the American reproduction is very Hollywoodish with 
only more violent and sexual scenes but a less convincing and profound plot of identity, not to mention 
its stereotyped and shoddy image of sinister Chinese smugglers employed by the PRC government, the 
USA’s post-cold-war hypothetical foe. Film critic Brian Hu (2006) has observed the Hollywood makers’ 
Sinophobe complex and their attempt to disassociate their adaptation from the original: “By denying the 
influence of Infernal Affairs, The Departed denies its non-American roots and cultural hybridity.” Yet is 
not the denial also a schizophrenic symptom signifying an American anxiety of Asian influence in the 
age of globalization? 
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scripts with social concern».12 Infernal Affairs, however, conceals the question of a 
postcolonial Hong Kong identity in the twists and turns of a thriller tradition. 
Inspired by the schizoid story of identity exchange in John Woo’s Face/Off (1997), it 
begins with respective recruitments of secret agents by drug lord Sam Hon (played 
by Eric Tsang) and police superintendent Wong Chi Shing (Anthony Wong). While 
Lau Kin Ming (Andy Lau) becomes a fake detective in Wong’s team, Chan Wing 
Yan (Tony Leung) has been an undercover operative inside Sam’s crime squad. The 
parallel fates of Lau and Chan make them mirror images of one another: where the 
former attempts unscrupulously to cover up his original identity, the latter makes 
every endeavor to bring himself to light. 13  Even their student identification 
numbers at the police training school, 4927 (Lau) and 27149 (Chan), are almost 
simple reversions of each other.14 The two men are one another’s double, both 
having desperate desire to gain a legitimate and eternal identity. 
 
With the plot twisting back and forth between Chan and Lau, the viewer is 
encouraged to shift ground between the two characters’ positions. On the one hand, 
Chan negotiates with his police handler Wong to end his ten-year masquerade; on 
the other, Lau is promoted to head the Criminal Intelligence Bureau and transferred 
to Internal Affairs (pun on the title Infernal Affairs) to ferret out the drug dealer 
Sam’s infiltrator, that is, ironically, himself. As they race to uncover each other, 
particularly in the back-street scene, it is as if they are chasing after their own 
identities in an inextricable maze. After Wong has been brutally killed by Sam’s 
underlings, Lau is able to pick up the connection with Chan by using the mobile 
phone left behind by Wong. The criminal mole and police snitcher co-operate by air, 
with the aid of Morse code, to capture Sam. Out of a crisis of consciousness rather 
than conscience, Lau means to renounce his unlawful past as he guns down his mob 
boss. Yet his illicit background is accidentally discovered when he finally 
encounters his counterpart in his office. 
 
The most intriguing scene of the crime thriller is when Lau realizes that his secret 
history is uncovered by Chan. Instead of taking his life, Lau determines to erase 
Chan’s computer file, thus permanently deleting his police identity. Here, as in the 
                                                 
12Leung Ping-kwan, «Urban Cinema and the Cultural Identity of Hong Kong», in Poshek Fu and David 
Desser, eds., The Cinema of Hong Kong: History, Arts, Identity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000, p249. 
13Critics have indicated that the innovation of Infernal Affairs in the subject of espionage lies in the 
counterpoint between the two protagonists. See, for example, Ling 2003: C8. 
14This is not a coincidence as Chan’s number was originally 36877 in the first three drafts of the script. 
See Mak Siu Fai and Chong Man Keung, Wujiandao qianzhuan: Juben, bianju Iunshu (Infernal Affairs: 
screenplay with scriptwriters’ commentary), 2003, pp.167-169. 
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plans and counter-plans of the operations on Sam’s cocaine deal with a Thai gang 
earlier in the film, bloody gunfights yield to psychic tensions.15 The psychic tension, 
to be further developed in the third part of the series, becomes a high-concept 
presentation of identity crisis. Such psychosis arises from the double life of being 
cat and mouse at the same time. Lau believes that the best way to annihilate Chan is 
to strip him of his real identity. What he does not understand is: his enemy is but 
his other, reversed self. Chan makes the same mistake, only more fatally so. He 
wants his identity back, but will not let Lau go with impunity. It ends up in a 
tragedy as the «gangster» contrives to arrest the «police». The former is shot dead 
on the spot by inspector Billy (Gordon Lam), who in turn is slain by Lau 
immediately after revealing that he used to be Sam’s informer, too. As more and 
more eyes and ears unexpectedly emerge from both camps along the plotline, we 
realize that the morbidity of the identity illness is so high that it becomes a 
collective crisis. Chan’s failure in his identity readjustment and justification in the 
final rooftop scene allegorically implies the impossibility of a return to the 
«original» identity of the Chinese population in Hong Kong prior to the Opium 
War (1839-42), the Sino-British drug war that resulted in the cession of the harbor. 
The double identity that disturbs the secret police throughout his life is indicated 
cinematographically by the close-up image of his corpse and its reflection on the 
metallic wall inside the elevator, whose dark shaft reappearing in the trilogy is 
evocative of the infernal motif. 
 
Compared with Chan’s destiny, Lau’s is rather ambiguous as it generates two 
endings. In the Hong Kong version, when he walks out from the elevator, he finally 
announces to his fellows: «I’m a cop». As he appears to have overcome his identity 
crisis, his fear is only temporarily suppressed and will reemerge as identity 
neurosis in Infernal Affairs III, which I shall discuss below. An alternate ending is 
given in the Malaysian/mainland Chinese version, in which inspector Cheung (Ng 
Ting Yip) has detected Lau’s criminal identity and arrests him right outside of the 
elevator. 16  Film critic Ma Chi attributes the discrepancy to the difference in 
geocultural background, namely, the pursuits of entertainment and commercial 
value in Hong Kong and the emphases of ideology and didactic function in the 
mainland.17 While the Mandarin denouement may be a result of official censorship 
                                                 
15It is untypical of action movies that the first gunfight does not occur until after the middle of the film 
(sc. 35E) and lasts for only 30 seconds. The climax also reworks Hollywood conventions by replacing 
actions with a face-off, turning the final confrontation into a conscious contemplation. 
16The Hong Kong version is the original design according to the first draft of the script. 
17Ma Chi, «Wenhua chayi yu chuangzuo jiqiao —Tan Wujiandao Xianggang neidi liang ge jieju» 
(«Cultural Difference and Artistic Technique: On the Two Endings of Infernal Affairs in Hong Kong and 
the Mainland», Wenwei po, 28th February, 2003, C8. 
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and moral standards, according to which the evil should never prevail over the 
good, the Cantonese coda goes beyond the cliché that every bad deed has its just 
reward to the possibility of an open identity, an identity that is flexible rather than 
fixable. With his double endings, Lau’s identity is not fixed, but mixed. Moreover, 
Lau’s survival only renders Chan’s sacrifice senseless and his obsession with a 
consistent, authentic identity inopportune in the face of rapidly changing realities. 
 
Chan’s police identity is not proved until six months after his death, when his 
appointed psychiatrist Lee Sum Yee (Kelly Chen) finds his file among the personal 
effects of the deceased headmaster of the cadet. Chan has once revealed his secret to 
Dr. Lee, who nevertheless thought that he was just kidding. Now, in the last scene 
of the cop drama, standing in front of Chan’s grave, Lee makes farewells to her 
patient: «How are you, Mr. Policeman?» The woman psychologist’s role as Chan’s 
mental mirror cannot be overemphasized. It is during her treatment that Chan 
wonders whether he is suffering from schizophrenia, and it is she who ultimately 
recovers his lost identity — though it is too late for him to be reinstated to his 
original post. In fact, her clinic, the only place he can fall asleep, has become his 
spiritual home or haven. In like vein, another female character, Mary (Sammi 
Cheng), also provides her fiancé, Lau, with a new hearth and home. Mary is writing 
a novel, in which she creates a man with multiple personalities, but she fails to 
finish it, especially after she learns about Lau’s espionage. Both female fringe 
figures enrich the masculine mafia movie in two profound ways: first, they open up 
a therapeutic feminine space in the midst of the manic male-dominated mise en 
scène; second, they compose a metanarrative that foregrounds the problem of 
identity. 
 
In contrast with the female figures, the father figures Wong and Sam are 
responsible for the fates of Chan and Lau — that is, the fate of the colonized — 
suggestive of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration that predetermines the city’s 
future. If Wong, father of the former Royal Hong Kong Police Force, represents the 
remnant British authorities, Sam symbolizes the pre-1997 domestic influence that 
stays in power in the new age. After Wong as the agent of the colonizer has been 
undone by Sam, the diametrically opposed moles Lau and Chan work together to 
get rid of the local villain, dreaming to walk out of their fathers’ shadows and 
recovering their own agencies. 
 
Although the deaths of the dads signify the end of a period of colonization, the 
aspirations for rebirth into real Chinese at the turn of the century prove to be 
apocalyptic anxieties. There is no reincarnation, only boundless suffering in the 
infinite inferno, which the film’s title refers to in its epigraph invoked from verse 
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nineteen of the Buddhist classic Nirvana Sutra: «The worst of the Eight Hells is 
called Continuous Hell. It has the meaning of Continuous Suffering». The Avinci or 
Continuous Hell is not a purgatory, where the fallen souls can possibly be purified 
through suffering; it is an abyss of incessant sufferings from kalpas to kalpas, which 
will never relieve one from the burden of guilt notwithstanding. The concept is 
reiterated in the prequel and sequel with more canonical citations that depict the 
infernal site as timeless, placeless, and with no exit. 
 
Such is the situation of Hong Kong. In one and a half centuries, the colony has 
changed from a fishing village to an industrial town to an international city, and 
has shifted from an identity vacuum of its precolonial past to the identity disorder 
of its postcolonial present. Yet its colonial identity remains, and will ever be, 
unfixed. In an interview of the screenwriters, while Chong observes that the 
multiple roles Hong Kong people have to play in the post-British period are again 
doubled, Mak asserts, «Hong Kong is a place allowing no hero».18And if there is 
one, it can only be — to use the description of Andy Lau’s role by German film 
critic Dan Fainaru — a «dark, shady, ambiguous hero».19 Truly, it is as dark as the 
absolute hell, as shady as the characters’ personalities, and as ambiguous as the 
normative citizenship. 
Double Identity/Troubled Genealogy 
Set from 1991 to 1997, Infernal Affairs II picks up the storyline from the first part’s 
opening flashback, when young Lau (Shawn Yue) and Chan (Edison Chen) are 
cadet classmates at the police academy, whereas Sam and Wong are collaborators in 
manipulating the underground. Lau is infatuated with Sam’s wife, also called Mary 
(Carina Lau), who instructs him to murder Sam’s triad chief Ngai Kwun (Joe 
Cheung) at Wong’s behest. Again, the female figure is at the center of gravity. Being 
the woman of the two father figures and admired by young Lau, Mary plays 
politics between the hostile underworld and police forces. At first, she appears to be 
a common ground where different identities have a share of their own interests, but 
when she bluntly refuses Lau’s affection and shows ultimate loyalty to her 
endangered husband, she is betrayed to the Ngai family by Lau. Lau regards Mary’s 
rejection as a denial of his status and thereafter makes up his mind to change it. It is 
after the unlawful death of the Chinese godmother in a traffic «accident» and under 
a standard portrait of Queen Elizabeth II, the British mother figure, that the 
                                                 
18Mak Siu Fai and Chong Man Keung, Wujiandao qianzhuan: Juben, bianju Iunshu (Infernal Affairs: 
screenplay with scriptwriters’ commentary), p.34. 
19Dan Fainaru, «Review of Infernal Affairs», at Screenplay.com 
(http://www.secreenplay.com/story.asp?storyid=11260), 2003. 
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criminal-turned-constable provocatively proclaims his careerism in response to the 
promotion board led by the British officers: «I guess we will have to start all over 
again». 
 
The prequel traces the first part’s development of double identity back to a troubled 
genealogy. Young Chan finds himself an abandoned and illegitimate child of the 
assassinated gangland guru. The desertion is redolent of the three abandonments of 
Hong Kong in its colonial history: first in 1841, when Hong Kong Island was ceded 
by the Manchu government; then in 1941, when the British surrendered to the 
Japanese; and lastly in 1997, when London handed her crown colony over to Beijing. 
Thus, in Hong Kong as in other parts of the world, colonization is a continuous 
multi-hegemonic operation that takes place neither once nor twice, but thrice or 
more. It amounts to a heterogeneous genealogy, a lineage of nonidentity. Resisting 
his illicit identity, Chan is determined to cut off his consanguinity with the triad 
family by taking the surname of his mother — though she is absent in the film — 
and becoming a policeman to arrest the Ngai’s. Unfortunately, he is expelled from 
the school after his family background is unveiled. To negotiate his cadetship, 
Wong offers an indecent proposal: in order to disengage himself from the 
underworld, he must first engage in it; that is, to serve as a mole among the Ngai’s, 
so as to sever himself from them. So, he has to start his life all over again as a 
gangster cast into a hell-like prison. While Wong plans to resign and leave Hong 
Kong after Ngai’s case, Chan wishes to «return» (not as a criminal, but as a cop) and 
have his own desk in the police department, yet their enduring duties drag them on 
till their tragic deaths. 
 
Chan is not alone in suffering from the obsession with identity. His half brother, 
Ngai Wing Hau (Francis Ng), who manages to ascend to the top seat in the triads 
with his cruelty and mercilessness, also desires to wipe out the blemish in his 
family history. The new godfather strives to become a political consultative 
candidate, hoping to rewrite the family saga on the threshold of dynastic change. 
He seizes the eve of the «liberation» as prime time to fix his identity, unaware of 
Chan’s double-cross. Despite their individual purposes, the two brothers represent 
a collective consciousness of the need to change from what Indian Hong Kong 
scholar Ackbar Abbas describes as «a «floating» identity that has served Hong Kong 
so well in the past» to a «definite identity» to be established for «current political 
exigencies».20 Like the dismissal of Chan from the police school, Ngai’s candidacy 
turns out to be a Cinderella dance at the ceremonial dinner on 30th June 1997, 
                                                 
20Ackbar Abbas, Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997, p.4. 

跨文本 62 
deadline of the Hong Kong dream. The playwrights choose the historical moment 
of «reunification», a time fraught with convivial tension, when Wong suddenly 
shows up at the banquet and presents an arrest warrant to the gangland kingpin. As 
invitations to celebration are withdrawn from him, Ngai’s candidacy is revoked by 
the PRC’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office. Finally, when he kidnaps Sam who 
is willing to serve as witness against him, he is shot dead by Wong. 
 
The mastermind’s tragedy lies in his misunderstanding of the political «transition» 
(guodu) as not only a change of the sovereign power, but also his chance for a 
renewed identity. He misrecognizes the end of British jurisdiction to be an 
expiration of colonial control and, more mortally, a return to stainless strain at what 
he believes to be the best of times. The theme of the return is now presented as an 
anxiety of time in the tragic heroes’ search of a lost — or, more precisely, an 
imagined — origin. Only before and after Sam’s narrow escape from Ngai’s killers 
in Thailand do Mary and Sam realize respectively that they have «passed the point 
of no return». The point of no return is dramatically documented at the end of the 
film, when all policemen and women change the emblems on their hats and in their 
station as the British flag is replaced by the PRC flag at the rainy handover 
midnight. Then the intense darkness of the night on 1st July 1997 is decorated by 
dazzling fireworks to celebrate the «return». 
Hong Kong/Xianggang 
The identity crisis finally leads to schizophrenia in Infernal Affairs III, a sequel made 
up of multiple parallel cuts between flashbacks and flashforwards with obsessive 
interest in dates indicating temporal disorientation. Reining up the usual excesses 
of bloody violence of the Hollywood-style action genre, this last installment of the 
police epic is more of a psychodrama — with an ending evocative of the stunning 
schizy scenes of the overwhelming wall-postings in Ron Howard’s A Beautiful Mind 
(2001) and Laetitia Colombani’s He Loves Me . . . He Loves Me Not (2002) — and 
almost a ghost story. A year after Chan’s death, Lau has been cleared of any charges 
in the case and starts to investigate the secret ties between chief inspector Yeung 
Kam Wing (Leon Lai), another rising star in the police force, and Shen Cheng (Chen 
Daoming), a mainland arms trafficker who wanted to build up a smuggling 
network with Sam three years ago. As the intricate plot develops, Lau, still obsessed 
by the proclamation «I’m a cop» and feeling insecure and paranoid about his career, 
gradually pushes himself into an abyss of mental disorder. He experiences a 
delusion of meeting with the departed Chan and Wong and an auditory 
hallucination of a phone call from Chan. When he looks at himself in the mirror and 
sees Chan’s image instead, he smiles approvingly. Apparently, he is possessed by 
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the spirit of Chan and projects his past self on Yeung; in other words, he is haunted 
by history and pursues his present self as the past other. However, in Dr. Lee’s 
clinic, where both Chan and Lau confess the truth during hypnotherapy, yesterday 
and today, self and other all collapse into an identity black hole. 
 
The film reaches its climax and complex when Lau leads his team to arrest Yeung. 
As the former shows evidence that only proves his previous collusion with Sam, he 
is actually acting as Chan to bust himself. But when Yeung announces himself to be 
a cop, Lau recalls the same self-identification by Chan a year ago. He suddenly 
turns around, counterclaiming that he himself is also a cop while shooting down 
Yeung. However, Lau kills not only Yeung, but also Lau’s alter ego and his memory 
of Chan as well. As Shen fires at Lau, we see Yeung, Chan (in black and white), and 
Lau falling to the ground one after another. Lau’s last bullet shot suicidally through 
his own upper jaw seriously damages his brain, leaving him in dementia. The 
penultimate scene has Lau unconsciously taping Morse code on his wheelchair in a 
hospital. 
 
While the small or lower-case other comes from fission within oneself, there is also 
a capital or upper-case Other that imposes a total identity anew. When the 
mysterious limper Shen reveals his real capacity as an undercover commissioner 
from the mainland but still conceals his name symbolically as Shadow, he 
immediately poses himself to be the new father figure overshadowing the powerful 
Wong, Sam, and Ngai all at once. It is his pistol that gets Lau under control, 
meaning that he settles the unsettled forcibly. Representing the domiNation, the 
mainlander demands that his Hong Kong partners speak Mandarin, commands his 
Hong Kong subordinates to cuff Lau, and at the end, in front of Chan’s and Yeung’s 
graves under the national and regional flags, recommends Hong Kongers to 
recommence: «Let bygones be bygones. Tomorrow is another day». A neocolonial 
cliché, this last statement urges the listener to turn over a new leaf of history from 
English colonization to Mandarin recolonization. It echoes Chan’s hope that 
«everything’ll be OK after tomorrow», which is frequently repeated by Chan 
himself and his other self, Lau. Yet tomorrow is another tomb to follow. 
 
The close-up of the five-star red flag highlights the fact that the China in question 
refers neither to an ethnical nation nor to a historical imagination, but to a political 
reality, an institutional entity known as the People’s Republic of China. The banner 
of national identity and the sacrifices to group loyalty signify a Party endorsed 
patriotism that declares the state to be adequate to every individual’s identity by 
easily simplifying the identity complex in the valance of fixed territoriality, 
sovereignty, and nationality. However, the strong Cantonese accent among native 
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Hong Kong Chinese will preclude all closures of the cleavage between Hong Kong 
and Xianggang, just like the ever-existing colonial rift between Hong Kong and 
Heung-gong. Here, identity disorder manifests itself as language disorder, wherein 
Mandarin is less an official language for national unification than part of a lingua 
franca of the port city. For the people who speak Cantonese as their first language, 
Mandarin, like English, means a barrier of identification, a practice of 
discrimination (by the colonizer), before it becomes a (blockaded) bridge for 
communication. One wonders since Mandarin has never been their mother tongue, 
how come the mainland is their motherland. Indeed, it is in the «dialectic» (both 
linguistically and philosophically) sense that the colonial city Hong Kong goes 
global, and Xianggang goes postcolonial, whereas Heung-gong is unrecognizable. 
One Country/Two Systems: Heterotopia and Schizophrenia 
Noteworthy are the cemetery scenes in all three installments of the trilogy. It is in 
the cemetery, the entrance to hades, that young Chan submits evidence of his 
brother’s crimes to Wong and requests a normalization of his identity (Infernal 
Affairs II), that Chan’s police identity is recognized only after his death (Infernal 
Affairs), and that the mainland master inculcates his Hong Kong subject with the 
need to bury the past (Infernal Affairs III). The burial ground is so symbolic that 
Foucault used it as an example of «heterotopias» in a 1967 lecture. 21Foucault 
formulates the concept by employing the mirror metaphor: on the one hand, the 
mirror is a utopia, reflecting the image of oneself in a placeless place behind the 
surface where one is visibly absent; on the other, it is also a heterotopia, a counter-
site existing physically in reality, where one’s self is reconstituted by seeing one’s 
own gaze from the other side of the glass. Foucault suggests: «The mirror functions 
as a heterotopia in this respect: it makes this place that I occupy at the moment 
when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, connected with all the 
space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has 
to pass through this virtual point which is over there».22 Accordingly, the modern 
cemetery appears as «the other city», a «dark resting place» for «the dead body, 
which is ultimately the only trace of our existence in the world and in language».23 
 
I would like to add that it is between the real and the unreal, between the living 
(present) and the dead (past), and between the metropolitan language (whether it 
be English or Chinese) and the local dialect that «I» is torn apart. The heterotopia 
                                                 
21Michel Foucault, «Of Other Spaces», trans. Jay Miskowiec, vol.16, no1, p.25. 
22Michel Foucault, p.24. 
23Michel Foucault, p.25 
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reveals our heterogeneity by exposing the otherness within. In effect, the 
heterotopic inhabitants are always preferably schizophrenic: half of a Chinese Hong 
Konger is British. This postcolonial psychological condition has been observed by 
Tu Wei-ming: «For the majority of Hong Kong residents, being Chinese as a British 
subject is, in human terms, arguably superior to being Chinese as a citizen of the 
People’s Republic of China». 24  Yet they cannot identify themselves with the 
Chinese or the British; they must be identified by their colonizers. Indeed, Hong 
Kong, be it a British colonial outpost or Chinese special administrative region, is a 
heterotopia rather than a «homogeneous society» as British scholar Matthew Turner 
believes it to be.25 Foucault describes a colony as a compensational heterotopia, a 
perfect and well-arranged space created as a contrast to the messy and ill-
constructed metropolis.26 The Asian trading center serves as a model for the 
declining British economy and now the other system under the so-called «one 
country, two systems» for the booming Chinese market. Nonetheless, being a 
colonial heterotopia, it deserves but heteronomy, because it would not have become 
the lustrous Pearl of the Orient had it not been cultured by the Orientalist 
hegemony, and now it can only maintain its glorious globality as a «Chinese» city 
without appealing for declaration of independence. 
 
Furthermore, we must not forget that the film per se as a fantasmatic projection of 
reality also gives rise to a heterotopic space, namely, the cinema. It is through the 
reflection of their transnational filmic images on the screen that Hong Kong people 
at last discover themselves. Thus, the movie serves as a mirror of the split mind, 
whereas the theater is a schizo-scenic site of delusions and hallucinations. The film 
is a hallucinogen that at once precipitates and treats schizophrenia. It triggers the 
madness from the shattered minds of the moviegoers, symptomizes/cinematizes it, 
so that they can recognize and manage it in their stressful urban life. 
 
Deng Xiaoping’s architecture of «one country, two systems» may be a great 
invention in bridging the macro gap between communism and capitalism, but it 
does not address the micro fissure of identity cleft, because the concept itself is 
schizophrenic in nature. There is still a long distance between Hong Kongers’ 
Chinese identity and their identification with China. The Infernal Affairs trilogy 
raises the issue of identity politics under the commercial camouflage of cops-and-
robbers thriller. The personal and collective quest for a legitimate Chinese identity 
                                                 
24Tu Wei-ming, «Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center», in Tu Wei-ming, ed., The Living Tree: The 
Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today, , Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, p.11. 
25Matthew Turner, «Hong Kong Sixties/Nineties: Dissolving the People», in Matthew Turner and Irene 
Ngan, eds, Hong Kong Sixties: Designing Identity, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Arts Centre, 1995, p.24. 
26Michel Foucault, «Of Other Spaces», p.27. 
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is perhaps desirable, yet doomed to failure because of betrayal. Such betrayal, as 
suggested by the moles’ job nature, is derived from a duplicity that unsettles any 
monolithic identity. Since the former British colony has been denounced by Beijing 
as an «anti-communist base» for its protests against and annual vigils in 
remembrance of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the identity duplicity is 
translated into potential treason to the party-state. The central government, so 
phobic about the historical humiliation and recent resistance brought by Hong 
Kong (reminiscent of Shen’s comment on his handicap caused by Chan in their gun 
battle), has pressed the local administration to legislate with a new internal security 
law. The Hong Kong-mainland relation, as the cooperation between Sam and Shen 
suggests is a suspicious and cautious one. 
 
This explains why film critic Li Cheuk-to cites the series as a major example in his 
review of the political messages of Hong Kong’s late movies: «The former colony’s 
recent cinema continues to reflect its uneasy relationship with Mainland China and 
its uncertain future».27 The future is certainly uncertain as long as there is a 
continuous process of in-between mixture of colonialism and globalism and in-itself 
breakdown of nationality and identity. It is in such schizophrenic sense of identity 
that Hong Kong is transforming into a postcolonial global city. 
                                                 
27Li Cheuk-to, «Journal: Hong Kong», Film Society of Lincoln Center (http://www.filmlinc/fcm/9-10-
2004/hongkongjournal.htm), 2004. 
